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Abstract
Development economists have long questioned the relationship between civil conflict, inequality, and ethnic
heterogeneity. While most quantitative literature has focused on inequality between individuals, this study
analyzes the relationship of horizontal inequality – between groups of individuals sharing a common identity
– and propensity for the onset of civil conflict, focusing on horizontal educational inequality (HEI). Findings
from Demographic and Health Survey data for 44 countries from 1986 to 2005 show that measures of both
female and male HEI are marginally or not significant in predicting civil conflict but strongly significant in
predicting ethnic civil conflict.
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1. Introduction 
 
“Simple inequality between rich and poor is not enough to cause violent conflict.  
What is highly explosive is […] ‘horizontal’ inequality: when power and 
resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in 
other ways – for instance by race, religion or language.” 
 - Kofi Annan, 1999 
 
Over the past half-century, civil conflict has been prevalent in a majority 
of the world’s developing countries.  Civil conflicts, measured by a threshold of 
25 battle-related deaths per year, have occurred in over half of all countries since 
1960.  Civil wars, measured by a threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths per year, 
have occurred in a third.  Certain regions of the world, such as sub-Saharan 
Africa, have consistently been embroiled in intrastate conflicts; at one point 
during the mid-1990s, a third of sub-Saharan African countries were involved in 
civil conflict at the same time (Blattman & Miguel, 2008).  Beyond its growing 
prevalence, civil conflict is also linked to devastating social and economic 
impacts.  For these reasons, there is strong consensus among economists on the 
need to increase our understanding of the causes of civil conflict, as can be seen in 
the sharp rise in conflict research since the 1990s (Dixon, 2009).   
Yet among the research and resulting publications, there is still little 
consensus on many of the most commonly proposed indicators of conflict.  In an 
aggregation of results from 46 quantitative studies on civil conflict, Dixon (2009) 
found clear consensus on no more than seven of over 200 tested variables, and 
even among those seven, he found contention over definition and measurement.  
Two of the most commonly included indicators are measures of inequality and 
ethnic heterogeneity.  However, while theoretically supported by much of the 
qualitative literature, measures of both inequality and ethnic heterogeneity were 
found to be insignificant in two of the most prominent quantitative analyses of 
civil war onset published in the last decade – studies by Fearon & Laitin (2003) 
and Collier & Hoeffler (2004).   
In reaction to these results, scholars are now focusing on measures of 
inequality and ethnic division that better capture the group aspect of conflict 
(Østby, 2008).  As stated by Kofi Annan in a 1999 address to the World Bank, 
inequality between groups is likely to lead to conflict, not simply inequality 
between individuals.  Furthermore, inequality that coincides with ethnic divides 
may be particularly dangerous (Annan, 1999; Stewart, 2000; Østby, 2008).  This 
type of inequality – formed between groups sharing a common identity – has been 
referred to as “horizontal inequality” in recent literature (Stewart, 2000; Østby, 
2008).  Different from “vertical inequality” that captures differences between 
individuals (often measured by Gini coefficients), horizontal inequality (HI) 
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captures aspects of both group and socio-economic polarization.  Thus, a measure 
of HI may better reflect the multidimensional nature of inequity that leads to 
conflict. 
Through extensive case study work, Stewart has added significantly to the 
literature on HI by examining the relationship between inequality and conflict in 
developing countries; however, due to the micro-level nature of her work, she 
typically selects on the dependent or independent variables, limiting the broader 
application of her results (Stewart, 2000; 2001; Stewart, Brown, & Mancini, 
2005).  For this reason, Østby has sought to conduct the first large-N analyses of 
HI in developing countries, using survey data from Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) to build measures of HI for socio-economic factors (Østby, 2005; 
2006; 2008; Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 2006).   
This paper builds upon Østby’s work examining HIs in education between 
ethnic groups in developing countries (Østby, 2008).  While Østby found 
horizontal educational inequality (in this paper referred to as HEI) to be 
marginally significant in predicting the onset of civil conflict, my analysis seeks 
to strengthen or refute her results by extending her methodology to a broader 
sample of countries and years and to data on both females and males.1
The structure of my paper is as follows:  I first discuss the literature on 
ethnic heterogeneity and inequality in relation to civil conflict, focusing on the 
differences between vertical inequality, polarization, and horizontal inequality.  I 
then present a theoretical framework for studying horizontal educational 
inequality, followed by my hypotheses and research design.  After discussion of 
variable selection and my model, I present the results of my analysis.  My main 
findings are that while female and male HEI are marginally significant or not 
significant in predicting civil conflict across both violence thresholds (in line with 
Østby’s results), both female and male HEI are strongly significant in predicting 
the onset of ethnic civil conflict, and female HEI is significant in predicting ethnic 
civil war.  Furthermore, male HEI interacts with conflict in different ways than 
female HEI.  I end my paper with a discussion of the limitations and further 
extensions of my study and some concluding remarks. 
  
Furthermore, I will broaden my independent variable to include measures of both 
civil conflict and ethnic civil conflict at two different violence thresholds.  Much 
of the literature on ethnicity and violence indicates that the causes of ethnic and 
non-ethnic conflicts may be significantly different, and I will examine if this 




                                                 
1 For reasons discussed in the following section, Østby restricts her analysis to females. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 Over the past decade, two of the most prominent and comprehensive 
studies of civil conflict onset have been published by economists seeking to 
establish the rationale behind group mobilization.  Fearon & Laitin (2003) and 
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) both drew on theory that conceives the decision to 
engage in civil conflict as an expected utility calculation, weighing the expected 
gains from rebellion, given a set of grievances, with the expected losses, including 
the opportunity cost of forgone production.2
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) modeled the demand for rebel labor as a 
function of collective grievances – including income inequality – and the supply 
of rebel labor as a function of the economic costs and benefits of rebellion – 
including social fractionalization.  Income inequality was measured by a Gini 
coefficient and by the ratio of the top-to-bottom quintiles of income, and asset 
inequality was measured by the Gini coefficient of land ownership.  Despite their 
hypothesis that the poor may rebel to induce wealth redistribution or that the rich 
may rebel to further secure their economic status, the measures of inequality were 
found to be insignificant.  Collier & Hoeffler also hypothesized that rebel armies 
would prefer to recruit along ethnic lines, since ethnic diversity within groups 
may cause frictions; thus, a society with a high degree of ethnic fractionalization 
would limit rebels to small recruitment pools, perhaps increasing the costs and 
decreasing the propensity of conflict.  Conversely, they hypothesized that a 
society that is ethnically polarized, or divided into a few larger groups, would 
have a higher risk of conflict, as there would be a higher possibility of disputes 
developing between distinct ethnic groups.  They measured ethnic diversity using 
an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
  Theories regarding income and asset 
inequality and ethnic heterogeneity played into both analyses. 
3 and adopted a measure of ethnic 
polarization4
 Fearon & Laitin (2003) also included income inequality in their analyses 
to test for possible grievances between groups, but like Collier & Hoeffler (2004), 
they found a measure of the Gini coefficient for income inequality to be 
insignificant.  Concerning ethnicity, however, they took an alternative approach 
and hypothesized that there may be a negative relationship between the level of 
 from Esteban & Ray.  However, once again, they found both 
measures to be insignificant in their models.   
                                                 
2 An elaboration of this theory in relation to my study can be found in the subsequent section on 
the theoretical framework for group mobilization (2.3). 
3 Interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected people within a country will be from 
different ethnic groups. 
4 Measures of fractionalization increase when the number of ethnic groups in a society increases; 
measures of polarization increase when there are few (equally) large ethnic groups exhibiting 
within-group similarities. 
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ethnic diversity and propensity for civil conflict, as more diversity provides 
grounds for more disputes.  They also tested for a possible inverted U-shaped 
relationship, with increased risk for either very high or very low levels of 
fractionalization.  However, they found these measures of ethnic fractionalization 
to be insignificant in their models.  Theorizing that ethnic diversity may lead 
specifically to ethnic conflict, Fearon & Laitin reran their analyses with ethnic 
conflict as the independent variable.  However, despite the theoretical 
relationship, they found no significant empirical relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and ethnic civil conflict.5
 
 
2.1 Issues with the Inequality–Conflict Literature  
 
 While the findings of Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon & Laitin 
(2003) seem to suggest that there exists no significant relationship between 
inequality, ethnicity, and civil conflict, I argue that their conclusions may be 
misleading, as both studies failed to account for the multidimensional aspect of 
conflict.  Both studies examined grievances and opportunities for conflict, but 
they only looked at one dimension of each.  Measures of income or asset 
inequality calculate relative deprivation between individuals in a country, referred 
to as “vertical inequality.”  Thus, these measures fail to incorporate the fact that 
rebellions are staged by groups, not individuals, and that groups need a common 
identity behind which to unite.  Measures of ethnic heterogeneity or polarization, 
on the other hand, provide evidence of unified groups that could possibly engage 
in conflict, but they fail to provide any compelling reason for conflict.  In fact, 
many countries are characterized by high levels of ethnic diversity but experience 
no significant conflict, such as Tanzania and Ghana, and it may be due to the lack 
of socio-economic inequalities (Østby, 2008).   
 Due to this disconnect in the literature on inequality and conflict, scholars 
have more recently turned to measures that capture the multidimensional aspect of 
conflict – the need for clearly identified groups (e.g. high ethnic polarization) and 
also for inter-group grievances (e.g. inequality).  Inequalities that form between 
culturally formed groups have become known as “horizontal inequalities” (HIs).  
The most comprehensive work on HIs comes from extensive case studies by 
Stewart across developing countries (Stewart, 2000; 2001; Stewart, Brown, & 
Mancini, 2005).  However, while contributing substantially to our understanding 
of HIs on a micro-level, her work is restricted to case studies and she typically 
selects on the dependent or independent variables, looking at countries where HIs 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that while Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin have published the most 
prominent studies on civil conflict onset, their results concerning inequality and ethnic 
heterogeneity have been supported throughout much of the conflict literature (Dixon, 2009; 
Sambanis, 2002; Østby, 2008). 
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have been found to lead to conflict.  This limits the application of her work to a 
broader range of countries or a more systematic approach. 
Another weakness of the inequality-conflict literature is that most studies, 
including the influential works of Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon & Laitin 
(2003), look only at aspects of economic inequality.  While many economic 
factors have been shown to play a significant role in predicting civil conflict, 
income and asset inequality are not the only factors that may lead to grievances or 
that signal potential costs and benefits of rebellion.  Stewart’s work has covered 
many aspects of inequality other than income, such as political and social welfare 
factors (Stewart, 2002).  One aspect of social welfare that may be a particularly 
important factor in terms of group grievances is education, because inequality in 
education is more likely to be the result of visible, systematic discrimination than 
income or even asset inequality is.  In many documented cases, the ruling power 
in a country has used state resources to limit educational access to minorities, 
such as in South Africa and Sri Lanka (Gurr, 2000; Murshed & Gates, 2005; 
Stewart, 2002).  Inequality stemming from such blatantly discriminatory actions 
may provide an impetus for group mobilization, and it is this aspect of inequality 
that I hope to capture in my study. 
 
2.2 Horizontal Educational Inequality 
 
 The first large-N studies of horizontal inequality done in relation to 
conflict have been conducted by Østby, and these analyses include both economic 
and social factors of HI (Østby, 2005; 2006; 2008; Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 2006).  
While measures of economic HI for income and asset distribution were 
consistently found to be insignificant in her work, Østby found some support for a 
measure of social HI, proxied by years of schooling.  In my study, I will refer to 
this measure as horizontal educational inequality (HEI).  To test for its 
significance, Østby created an index of HEI from survey data and regressed it on 
civil conflict onset, controlling for three commonly included variables in the 
conflict literature – GDP per capita, population, and conflict history.  She found 
HEI to be significant at the 10% level for predicting the onset of civil conflict, a 
result she claimed to be noteworthy given the small sample size and non-
significance of the other variables included in the model (Østby, 2008). 
However, there are a few discrepancies in Østby’s theory that may 
undermine her results.  First, Østby creates her indicators for HI based solely on 
data gathered from females, but she does not acknowledge this in her work.  She 
most likely focuses on females because of the nature of Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS), the source for her explanatory HI variables, which focus on 
females and households rather than males.  However, I would expect female and 
male HEI to interact differently with conflict, perhaps at least with different 
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magnitudes, so I believe the assumption that they perform the same may be 
misleading.  Another critique is that Østby does not examine ethnic conflict as an 
independent variable in her models, despite the inherent definition of HI as 
promoting group mobilization along ethnic lines.  Much of the conflict literature 
on ethnic mobilization suggests decreased transaction costs and increased intra-
group trust when groups act along ethnic lines, decreasing the costs and therefore 
increasing the likelihood of conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Sambanis, 2001; 
Østby, 2008).  I would expect a stronger relationship between HEI and ethnic 
civil conflict than I would between HEI and overall civil conflict.  Finally, Østby 
is limited in her analysis by the availability of DHS surveys.  Yet since the time of 
her study, several more DHS surveys on a wider range of countries have become 
available.  Testing her methodology on a more representative sample would serve 
as a desirable robustness check to her analysis. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework for Group Mobilization 
 
In developing a theoretical framework for my own study of HEI and the 
propensity for civil conflict, I adopt the intuition behind a model by Esteban & 
Ray (2008) which seeks to explain the behavior of participants in civil conflict.6
To measure the expected payoffs of conflict, Esteban & Ray assume that 
each individual in a group that decides to rebel incurs some cost of resources used 
in rebellion, measured by c(ri), where i = 1, 2 indicates membership in one of the 
two groups.  Each individual that participates in rebellion also gains some 
expected benefit in increased access to education.  This is measured by the 
difference in utility between a preferred educational outcome and the current 
status quo outcome, bi, multiplied by the probability of attaining the preferred 
outcome, pi.
  
Esteban & Ray describe conflict as a rent-seeking game, where in deciding 
whether to rebel, participants weigh the expected payoffs of participating in 
conflict against the payoffs of accepting the status quo distribution of a public 
good.  For my study, I will assume that the public good at stake is education 




  The expected utility of an individual who rebels is thus given by 
      ui = pibi – c(ri).                (1) 
                                                 
6 The model presented in the 2008 paper is one application of a broader model developed earlier 
(Esteban & Ray, 1999).  However, for the purposes of this paper, the model presented in the 2008 
paper includes all relative aspects for examining the distribution of a public good between two 
distinct groups. 
7 In Esteban & Ray (2008), this probability is defined as a function of the group size, but it could 
also be seen as a measure of wealth, power, motivation, etc. 
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 The expected utility for participating in conflict given in (1) is then 
compared with the utility derived from retaining the status quo distribution of 
education.  Let this status quo utility be measured by γi for each individual in a 
group.  By assuming rationality in maximizing utility, it can be seen that members 
of a group will rebel if and only if 
 
    ui  γi for i = 1, 2.            (2) 
 
Thus, the decision to rebel is a function of the expected gains from rebellion, the 
probability of staging a successful rebellion, the cost of staging a rebellion, and 
the level of satisfaction with the status quo distribution.  If the expected gains in 
utility from fighting never outweigh the utility derived from the status quo, then 
an equilibrium will be reached at which both groups are at peace. 
 The simple intuition used to derive (2) provides a basis for predicting the 
relationship between HEIs and the propensity for civil conflict.  Since for conflict 
to take place, ui  γi must occur for one of the groups, I would expect a higher 
propensity for conflict when γi is low for one of the groups than when γi is high, 
ceteris paribus.  Since γi is the utility derived from the status quo distribution of 
education in a country, this is likely to be low for one group when there are large 
disparities in years of schooling between the two groups.  As noted in the earlier 
discussion of horizontal inequalities, this disparity is captured by a measure of 
HEI, thus leading to my first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The higher the level of HEI in a country, the higher the risk of civil conflict. 
 
Since HEI is a measure of inequality between ethnic groups, I would also 
expect a strong relationship between the level of HEI in a country and the risk of 
ethnic civil conflict.  Ethnic conflict is typically defined as civil conflict in which 
armed organizations both explicitly pursue ethno-nationalist aims and also recruit 
fighters and forge alliances along ethnic lines.  Scholars have theorized that 
groups with shared identities have lower costs of rebellion, since they can more 
easily recruit from within the identity group, they are less burdened by collective 
action problems due to suspicions between group members, and they often have 
political or cultural symbols and ideals to rally behind (Cederman, Wimmer, & 
Min, 2010; Fearon, 2004; Gurr, 2000; Sambanis, 2001).  I theorize that this 
decrease in costs for ethnic mobilization, measured in (2) by a drop in c(ri), leads 
to an increase in the expected utility from rebellion, measured by ui, thus leading 
to an increase in the likelihood that ui  γi, inducing an ethnic group into 
rebellion.  This theory provides me with my second hypothesis: 
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H2:  The higher the level of HEI in a country, the higher the risk of ethnic civil 
conflict. 
 
A final application of (2) in my study is that a group that places a higher 
value on education would experience a higher value of bi, since it takes into 
account the utility derived from any given level of education.  Since males are the 
primary income earners in many developing countries, they stand to gain more 
economically from an increase in education than do females.  This may suggest 
that given the same level of HEI for males and females, males may perceive more 
value in the potential to increase their access to education.  A higher level of bi in 
(2) would correspond with a higher level of ui, again increasing the likelihood of 
rebellion.  This provides me with my third hypothesis regarding gender 
differences within measures of HEI: 
 
H3:  Given equal levels of HEI, there will be a higher risk for civil conflict and/or 
ethnic civil conflict associated with male HEI than with female HEI.  
 
This hypothesis may gain additional support from conclusions drawn by 
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) that males with low levels of secondary education are 
more likely to join rebellions, as their opportunity cost of fighting is much lower.  
This would play into the utility maximizing function for males as a lower c(ri), 
leading to a higher ui, but would not play into the function for females, as they 
typically do not supply rebel labor.  This difference may further increase the 
likelihood of my third hypothesis holding true. 
 
3. Data & Methodology 
 
 This study seeks to test the hypotheses presented above through an 
empirical analysis of all countries in which at least one Demographic and Health 
Survey was conducted over the period 1986 to 2005.  DHS surveys are part of an 
ongoing research project by the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and are intended to collect reliable information on the welfare of women 
and households in developing countries.  To be qualified for my analysis, the 
surveys needed to include data on ethnicity and years of schooling attained for 
each participant.  As some surveys excluded data on ethnicity due to the 
sensitivity of ethnicity information in many developing countries, the scope of my 
study was limited to 93 surveys on 44 countries for females and 57 surveys on 32 
countries for males.  The number of valid surveys is fewer for males because 
DHS data focuses primarily on females; however, many countries have begun to 
collect information on males more consistently in recent years, allowing for the 
inclusion of male indicators in my study. 
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 While relying on DHS surveys limits the scope of my study, it also allows 
for the creation of highly reliable group-level indicators of horizontal inequalities, 
as done by Østby in several studies (Østby, 2006; 2008; Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 
2006).  DHS surveys are characterized by large sample sizes, random sampling, 
and standardized questionnaires, leading to the creation of reliable indicators 
across countries and across time.  Any validity problems are also minimized by 
the simplicity of the questions used for this study, since questions on ethnicity and 
years of schooling should require straightforward answers.  The list of all DHS 
surveys and countries used in this study can be found in Appendix A.  
Furthermore, a map of the geographic distribution of countries can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
3.1 Dependent Variables: Civil and Ethnic Civil Conflict 
 
 To test my hypotheses, I will employ four separate variables of civil 
conflict onset in my analysis – civil conflict, civil war, ethnic civil conflict, and 
ethnic civil war.  The data come from the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset compiled 
by Cederman, Min, & Wimmer and are based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflicts Data Set (ACD), Version 3-2005b (Gleditsch et at. 2002).  Each 
variable is binary and takes the value of 1 for years in which a conflict begins and 
0 otherwise.  Civil conflict is defined as any armed and organized confrontation 
between government troops and rebel organizations or between army factions that 
reaches an annual threshold of 25 battle-related deaths.  Civil war is similarly 
defined, but with an annual threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths.  Ethnic civil 
conflict is defined as civil conflict in which armed organizations both explicitly 
pursue ethno-nationalist aims and interests and also recruit fighters and forge 
alliances along ethnic lines.  Ethnic civil conflict refers to an annual threshold of 
25 battle-related deaths, whereas ethnic civil war is similarly defined but refers to 
an annual threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths.  It should be noted that by these 
definitions, civil conflict/ethnic civil conflict include those conflicts also identified 
as wars, and civil conflict/civil war include those conflicts also identified as 
ethnic.  The frequency of each type of conflict in my dataset can be seen in Table 
1 below. 
 
TABLE 1: Frequency of conflict onset in the data (female and male data sets) 
FEMALE 
Identity 
Ethnic and Non-ethnic Ethnic only 
Intensity 
Civil Conflict 39 28 
Civil War 20 13 
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 MALE 
Identity 
Ethnic and Non-ethnic Ethnic only 
Intensity 
Civil Conflict 28 22 
Civil War 16 12 
 
 
3.2 Independent Variable:  Horizontal Educational Inequality 
 
 My measure of horizontal educational inequality is adopted from Østby 
(2008) and is based on information from DHS survey data on ethnic affinity and 
years of schooling.  Following the approach of Brockerhoff & Hewett (2000) that 
was applied by Østby, I focus on the two largest ethnic groups in each country.  In 
doing so, I assume that the level of inequality between the two largest ethnic 
groups within a country is most important in predicting civil conflict.  My 
indicator of HEI is generated using two variables from the DHS surveys for 
females/males: v131/mv131 (ethnicity) and v133/mv133 (total years of education 
completed).  In order to compare HEIs across countries, a measure is needed that 
reflects levels of inequality on a standardized scale.  To do so, Østby uses the 
following formula: 
 
  HEI = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝�− �𝑙𝑛 �𝐸1 𝐸2� ���            (3) 
 
where E1 is the average educational attainment in years of schooling for the first 
ethnic group and E2 is the average educational attainment for the second ethnic 
group.  This measure is scaled from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating perfect equality in 
educational attainment (both groups have same average years of schooling) and 1 
indicating that one group has all of the educational attainment (measured in years 
of schooling) and the other group has none.  In my dataset, the measure of female 
HEI ranges from .000 to .800 and the measure of male HEI ranges from .014 to 
.749 (the highest actual level of observed inequality). 
 The values calculated for HEI are then interpolated between survey years 
and extrapolated to cover the time span of the study, 1986-2005.  Simple linear 
interpolation is used between survey years.  Extrapolation is done by adopting the 
value of HEI from the survey closest in time for previous and subsequent years 
within the time period.  For countries with only one survey, the value of HEI for 
that survey is used for all years in order to increase the sample size of the study.  
10
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While this may weaken the validity of my independent variable, it is important to 
note that inequality often changes slowly over time, and thus the accuracy of the 
measure still remains reasonably strong (Østby, 2006).  Another important 
limitation of my data is that the sample suffers from potential selection bias.  DHS 
surveys are not conducted in countries that are heavily war-ridden, and for some 
countries that do host DHS surveys, ethnicity data is censored due to its highly 
sensitive nature.  It should be noted, however, that these selection biases tend to 
omit countries that potentially would further strengthen my hypotheses, and thus 
their omission puts a possible downward bias on the results (Oswald, 2010; 
Østby, 2008). 
 
3.3 Control Variables 
 
 I control for other robustly significant variables in the civil conflict 
literature, focusing on those included in Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) model of civil 
conflict onset.  As noted throughout the civil conflict literature, Fearon & Laitin 
have employed perhaps the most comprehensive and well-supported model of 
conflict onset to this date, and their approach has been replicated in several other 
studies of civil conflict initiation (Blattman & Miguel, 2008; Dixon, 2009; 
Sambanis, 2001; 2002; Thyne, 2006).  As noted by Dixon (2009), all seven of the 
independent variables found by Fearon & Laitin to be significant have been well 
supported in subsequent literature.  Thus, I will include these controls in my 
analysis.  Other authors have shied from including more than three or four control 
variables in their analyses due to concerns over multicollinearity; however, as can 
be seen by the covariance table in Appendix C, collinearity does not seem to be a 
considerable issue for my data (Oswald, 2010; Østby, 2008).  Furthermore, 
rerunning the models with fewer control variables was found to not significantly 
alter the main results.  To deal with possible problems of endogeneity in my 
models, all time variate control variables listed below are lagged by one year, 
following the methodology of Fearon & Laitin (2003) and others. 
 Three of the most commonly controlled for factors in models of civil 
conflict onset are economic development, population size, and conflict history.  
The first, economic development, is proxied by GDP per capita and is given in 
constant 2000 US Dollars.  The negative effect of GDP per capita on propensity 
for civil conflict is one of the most widely supported relationships in the literature.  
The second  control variable, log transformed population size, is theorized to have 
a positive relationship with civil conflict onset, as a large population makes it 
easier for rebels to evade notice and detainment by the central authorities and also 
provides a larger recruitment base.  Thirdly, I control for the number of years 
since the previous conflict, peace years, at the given violence threshold – so, 
years since the previous conflict for the conflict variables and years since the 
11
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previous war for the war variables.  This aims to control for any temporal 
dependence within the data.8
 Factors concerning the political environment in a country often are 
associated with the risk of civil conflict breakout.  It is theorized that democracy 
should exhibit a negative relationship with civil conflict, since democracies 
provide a political environment in which all citizens have some political power, 
reducing discrimination and repression of certain groups.  A dummy variable for 
democracy is thus included, measured by a score of +6 or higher on the Polity IV 
scale.  It is also hypothesized that autocracies may be associated with less civil 
conflict, since an authoritative state is well equipped to suppress rebellion.  To 
test this line of thinking, a control for political systems that are neither democratic 
nor autocratic, known as anocracies, is included.  Anocracy should thus exhibit a 
positive relationship with civil conflict, and it is coded as a dummy variable for 
political systems that lie between -6 and +6 on the Polity IV scale.  A third control 
is included for political environments that are unstable, since recent changes in 
the central government may indicate disorganization and potential to be 
overthrown by rebels.  Thus, a dummy variable for regime change is included that 
indicates a movement along the Polity IV scale of 3 or more points over the prior 
three years.  Finally, it is hypothesized that the government of a new state may be 
weak within the first few years of formation, as it has not yet settled into a stable 
structure and may still have new or untested military operations.  Since this may 
leave the government vulnerable to rebellion, a dummy variable for new state is 
included, coded for countries in the first two years of existence. 
 
 Lastly, three controls related to geography and natural resources are 
included.  Countries that depend heavily on oil exports tend to have weaker 
centralized governments, as rulers can depend on oil rents and do not require 
elaborate bureaucratic systems to raise tax revenues.  Furthermore, capturing oil 
revenues may serve as an incentive to gain control of the state.9
                                                 
8 I also ran my analyses with cubic splines to further control for temporal dependence, following 
the methodology of Østby (2008) and others; however, inclusion of the splines did not 
significantly alter my findings, so I excluded them from the results shown in this paper.  For an 
explanation of the rationale for cubic splines, see Beck, Katz, & Tucker (1998). 
  Thus, oil 
production per capita, as measured by the annual oil production in metric tons 
divided by the population, is included in my analysis.  Similar to the rationale for 
a large population, rough terrain should favor rebellion as it makes it easier for 
rebels to evade notice and capture from the central government.  I follow Fearon 
& Laitin (2003) by controlling for the percent of a country covered in 
mountainous terrain, according to the coding of geographer A. J. Gerard.  Finally, 
9 An alternative explanation is provided by Wimmer & Min (2006), who hypothesize that states 
that depend on oil rents instead of a constituent tax base may develop higher degrees of 
clientelism, especially along ethnic lines.  This ethnic exclusion may provide the impetus for 
mobilization against the state, leading to higher prevalence of civil conflict. 
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it is predicted that a country that includes some territories separated from the 
state’s center by water or distance (for example, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) 
from West Pakistan or an island nation such as the Philippines) may be at higher 
risk for rebellion, as the government may not be able to retain control over distant 
or separate territories.  To control for this, a dummy for noncontiguous state is 
included.  
 
3.4 Empirical Model 
 
Due to the binary nature of my dependent variables, I employ a logistic 
regression model to test my hypotheses.  This model predicts the odds of civil 
conflict onset by fitting data to a logistic curve.  Following the methodology of 
Østby and others, I use country-clustered standard errors, which relaxes the 
assumption of completely independent observations from the same countries over 
time (Sambanis, 2001; Østby, 2008).  It should be noted however, that running the 
regressions using regular robust standard errors instead of robust clustered 
standard errors did not significantly alter my results.  Analyses were performed 
using STATA, version 11.1.  Descriptive statistics for each variable can be found 




 As noted previously, I employ logistic regression models to test my 
hypothesized relationships between HEI and civil conflict.  I start by presenting 
the results of my analysis of female HEI, measured for 44 countries from 1986 to 
2005.  To test my first hypothesis – that higher levels of HEI are associated with a 
higher propensity for civil conflict – I regress the onset of civil conflict and civil 
war on female HEI and my control variables.  The results of these regressions can 
be seen in Model 1 and Model 2 presented in Table 2 below. 
In the first model, I find female HEI to be significant and positively 
correlated with increased propensity for civil conflict onset.  This finding supports 
the analysis done by Østby (2008) on a smaller set of countries and years, in 
which she found HEI to be positive and significantly related to conflict at the 10% 
level.  The marginal effect of HEI is also strong, as a 0.1 increase in the value of 
HEI (on a 0 to 1 scale) is associated with a 26% increase in the odds of civil 
conflict onset.  This means that the odds of civil conflict onset for the maximum 
level of observed HEI in this dataset are 3.28 times higher than the odds of 
conflict for the average level of HEI.  In my model of civil war initiation (Model 
2), female HEI is not found to be significant.  This may suggest that a high level 
of HEI for females may mobilize groups to engage in minor conflicts, but it is not 
enough to justify large-scale conflicts that are much more costly. 
13
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TABLE 2: Conflict Onset in 44 Developing Countries, 1986 – 2005 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Civil Conflict Civil War Ethnic Civil Conflict 
Ethnic 
Civil War 

































































































N Observations 834 834 834 834 
N Conflict onsets 39 20 28 13 
Logit estimates with robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01 
† Lagged one year 
 
Turning to ethnic conflict, Model 3 from Table 2 shows that female HEI is 
strongly associated with the onset of ethnic conflict and is significant at the 1% 
level.  It is also significant in magnitude, as an increase in the level of HEI of 0.1 
(on a 0 to 1 scale) is associated with a 56% increase in the odds of ethnic conflict 
initiation.  This means that the odds of ethnic conflict onset at the highest 
observed level of female HEI are 10 times the odds of conflict onset at the mean 
value of HEI.  This result lends support to my second hypothesis that high levels 
of HEI affect propensity for ethnic conflict at a higher magnitude than they affect 
civil conflict.  Furthermore, this relationship holds for higher thresholds of 
violence.  Female HEI significantly predicts the onset of ethnic civil war, whereas 
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it was not found to be significant in the model of overall civil war.  The percent 
change in odds associated with an increase in female HEI is less for ethnic civil 
war than for ethnic civil conflict but is still greater than for overall civil conflict – 
an increase of 0.1 is associated with a 47% increase in the odds of ethnic civil war 
onset.  This translates into the odds of onset at the highest level of observed 
female HEI being 7.27 times the odds of onset at the average level of HEI. 
In the four models presented in Table 2, only new state and noncontiguous 
state are consistently significant in predicting the onset of conflict, and they both 
contribute heavily in magnitude to the odds of conflict onset.  For countries in my 
dataset, being in the first two years of existence increases the odds of civil conflict 
and civil war onset by 33 and 20 times, respectively, and increases the odds of 
ethnic civil conflict and ethnic civil war by 1043 and 2611 times, respectively.  
Being a noncontiguous state increases the odds of civil conflict and civil war 
onset by 8.3 and 6.4 times, respectively, and increases the odds of ethnic civil 
conflict and ethnic civil war by 70 and 68 times, respectively.  The extreme nature 
of these results is likely due to the small size of my dataset, which includes a 
higher percentage of noncontiguous countries and newly formed countries than a 
more representative sample; however, the results still signal a strong relationship 
that has been supported both theoretically and empirically in conflict literature. 
GDP per capita and oil production per capita are found to be significant 
in the models of ethnic conflict and war but not in those for overall conflict and 
war.  A one-dollar increase in per capita GDP is associated with 61.3% decrease 
in the odds of ethnic civil conflict onset and a 70.9% decrease in the odds of 
ethnic civil war onset.  This supports much of the literature on civil conflict that 
predicts a decrease in conflict with higher levels of economic development.  High 
levels of oil production, theorized to increase the risk of conflict due to 
dependence on oil rents, is found to increase the odds of ethnic civil conflict by 
99% per extra metric ton of oil per capita, and increase the odds of ethnic civil 
war by 142% for the same increment. 
 Analyzing the same models, but using male HEI and 32 countries from 
1986 to 2005, I am able to compare the differences between female and male HEI 
and their relationship with civil conflict onset.  Models 5 and 6 in Table 3 again 
test my first hypothesis, and similar to the results from the female HEI data, it can 
be seen that male HEI is marginally significant in predicting the onset of civil 
conflict and not significant in predicting civil war.  This shows some support that 
male and female measures of HEI seem to exhibit parallel effects on civil conflict.  
The economic significance of male HEI in Model 5 is also very similar to that for 
female HEI in Model 1; an increase of 0.1 in the value of HEI (on a 0 to 1 scale) 
is associated with a 25% increase in the odds of civil conflict onset, whereas it 
was a 26% increase for female HEI.  This begins to draw into question my third 
15
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hypothesis, which posits that male HEI will be higher in magnitude than female 
HEI in predicting civil conflict onset. 
 
TABLE 3: Conflict Onset in 32 Developing Countries, 1986 – 2005 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Civil Conflict Civil War Ethnic Civil Conflict 
Ethnic 
Civil War 





























































































N Observations 609 609 609 609 
N Conflict onsets 28 12 22 8 
Logit estimates with robust country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10; **p ≤ 0.05; ***p ≤ 0.01 
† Lagged one year 
--- Democracy removed from civil war models due to perfect collinearity 
 
To further test my second hypothesis, I model the relationship between 
male HEI and my controls and ethnic civil conflict and ethnic civil war.  Once 
again, ethnic civil conflict is significantly linked with the measure of HEI, this 
time being for males.  However, the magnitude of the significance is smaller in 
Model 7 than it was for the parallel model of female HEI.  A 0.1 increase in the 
value of male HEI is associated with a 53% increase in the odds of ethnic civil 
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conflict onset (compared to a 56% increase for female HEI).  This means that the 
odds of ethnic civil conflict onset for the maximum level of observed male HEI in 
this dataset are 8.48 times higher than the odds of conflict for the average level of 
male HEI.  Contrary to my findings for female HEI, however, the male HEI is not 
significant in the model of ethnic civil war.  This fits with the overall trend of a 
weaker relationship between HEI and high levels of conflict, likely because rebels 
may need a considerably larger motive to engage in such costly activity.  This 
result also further disproves my third hypothesis, as male HEI is not significant in 
predicting ethnic civil war, but female HEI is significant.  One important 
consideration is the smaller size of the data set for males, as I was limited in scope 
by the availability of surveys.  It may also be unsound to compare male and 
female estimates from different data sets, as they reflect a different cross-section 
of countries.  Further research into the relationship between female and male HEI 
will be needed to better inform the accuracy of my third hypothesis. 
 Similar to the models of female HEI and conflict onset, new state and 
noncontiguous state are consistently significant in Models 5-8.  For countries in 
the male dataset, being in the first two years of existence increases the odds of 
civil conflict and civil war onset by 1692 and 156 times, respectively, and 
increases the odds of ethnic civil conflict and ethnic civil war by 30492 and 2281 
times, respectively.  Being a noncontiguous state increases the odds of civil 
conflict and civil war onset by 24 and 6.1 times, respectively, and increases the 
odds of ethnic civil conflict and ethnic civil war by 61 and 7.6 times, respectively.  
Again, the extreme results of the magnitude of new state are likely due to the size 
of the sample, which may not be representative of all developing countries.  Other 
variables reaching significance in the models include GDP per capita for ethnic 
and civil conflict and ethnic civil war, similar to the female models, and oil 
producation per capita for all models.  The number of peace years is found to be 
significant for civil conflicts, but not for civil wars, whereas the percentage of 
mountainous terrain is significant in the models of civil war but not civil conflict.  
The number of peace years may be significant for civil conflict because of the 
more frequent nature of conflicts in compariso to wars.  Additionally, 
mountainous terrain may be significant for civil war but not for conflict because 




 Building primarily on the work of Østby (2008), this study has 
demonstrated that examining horizontal inequalities, especially in relation to 
social factors such as education, is an important extension of the classic civil 
conflict literature.  In contrast to prominent studies that have found only 
insignificant relationships between inequality, ethnic heterogeneity, and civil 
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conflict, horizontal educational inequality was found to be marginally significant 
in predicting civil conflict and strongly significant in predicting ethnic civil 
conflict in this study.  Furthermore, while Østby was able to establish a link 
between female HEI and conflict, I was able to extend that relationship to male 
HEI and higher levels of conflict, increasing the significance of the results.   
 There are several limitations to my study that I have discussed throughout 
my paper.  One of the biggest restrictions is the small sample size, as 44 countries 
may not be representative of the population of developing countries for female 
estimates, and 32 countries for male estimates are likely even less representative.  
This could lead to skewed estimates in some of my models.  The calculation of 
HEI is also somewhat limiting, as it can only be constructed for country-years in 
which a DHS survey has taken place, and values must be interpolated and 
extrapolated from those years.  A more accurate measure would be calculated 
from data on each country-year, but that type of data is not currently available.  
Promisingly, DHS surveys continue to expand their coverage, so future studies of 
a similar nature could employ more years and more countries in their analyses. 
 Future extensions of this study could include other measures of HI 
concerning economic, political, or other social factors.  Establishing the links 
between these measures and ethnic conflict would be worthwhile, especially 
given some of the significant results found in this paper.  Furthermore, exploring 
the relationship between female and male indicators of HI for different socio-
economic factors would add to our understanding of the causes of civil conflict.  
An analysis of the policy implications of these results, while outside of the scope 
of this paper, would aid greatly in understanding the importance of HI and would 
be an interesting complement to the empirical results of my study.  Furthermore, 
it would allow for these results to be applied towards actual policy-making that 
could aid in reducing the prevalence of civil conflict in developing countries.
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APPENDIX A: Countries and DHS Surveys included in the analysis 
 
Country Year Country Year 
Albania 2008* Mali  1987 
Armenia 2000*  1995* 
Azerbaijan 2006*  2001* 
Benin  1996*  2006* 
 2001* Moldova  2005* 
 2006* Mozambique  1997* 
Brazil  1991 Namibia  1992 
 1996  2000* 
Burkina Faso  1993* Nepal  1987 
 1998*  1996 
 2003*  2001* 
Cameroon  1991*  2006* 
 1998* Niger  1992* 
 2004*  1998* 
Central African Republic 1994*  2006* 
Chad  1996* Peru  1991 
 2004*  2000 
Cote d’Ivoire  1994* Philippines  1993 
 1998  1998 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  2007*  2003* 
Ethiopia  2000*  2008 
 2005* Republic of the Congo  2005* 
Gabon  2000* Rwanda  1992* 
Ghana  1988 Senegal  1986 
 1993*  1992* 
 1998*  1997* 
 2003*  2005* 
 2008* Sierra Leone  2008* 
Guatemala  1987 South Africa  1998 
 1995 Sri Lanka  1987 
 1998 Togo  1988 
Guinea  1999*  1998* 
 2005* Trinidad and Tobago  1987 
India  1992 Turkey  1993 
 1998 Uganda  1988 
Kazakhstan  1995  1995* 
 1999*  2000 
Kenya  1989 Uzbekistan  1996 
 1993* Vietnam  1997 
 1998*  2002 
 2003* Zambia  1992 
 2008*  1996* 
Kyrgyz Republic  1997  2001* 
Liberia  1986  2007* 
Malawi 2000* Zimbabwe  1988 
 2004*  1994* 
   1999 
* Survey years including both male and female data (otherwise female only) 
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APPENDIX B: Geographic Distribution of Survey Countries 
 
 
    
 Female data only 
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APPENDIX C: Covariance Tables (female and male data) 
 
 FHEI GDPPCL LPOPL CPYRS WPYRS DEML ANOCL NWST RGCHG OILPCL LMTN NCON 
Female HEI (FHEI) 1.000            
GDP per capita (GPDPCL) -0.213 1.000           
Population size (LPOPL) 0.215 -0.131 1.000          
Conflict Peace Years (CPYRS) -0.142 0.126 -0.177 1.000         
War Peace Years (WPYRS) -0.203 0.131 -0.175 0.690 1.000        
Democracy (DEML) 0.003 0.282 0.238 0.088 0.065 1.000       
Anocracy (ANOCL) 0.001 -0.117 -0.115 -0.104 0.016 -0.562 1.000      
New state (NWST) -0.075 0.101 -0.047 -0.072 -0.104 -0.005 0.029 1.000     
Regime change (RGCHG) 0.072 -0.144 -0.048 0.018 0.043 -0.078 0.195 -0.045 1.000    
Oil production (OILPCL) -0.201 0.698 -0.396 0.148 0.116 -0.030 0.037 -0.006 -0.026 1.000   
Mountainous terrain (LMTN) 0.239 0.008 0.391 -0.213 -0.394 0.057 0.012 0.056 -0.068 -0.254 1.000  
Noncontiguous state (NCON) -0.094 0.017 0.452 -0.209 -0.295 0.225 -0.172 0.029 -0.003 -0.025 0.189 1.000 
 
 MHEI GDPPCL LPOPL CPYRS WPYRS DEML ANOCL NWST RGCHG OILPCL LMTN NCON 
Male HEI (MHEI) 1.000            
GDP per capita (GPDPCL) -0.210 1.000           
Population size (LPOPL) 0.222 -0.401 1.000          
Conflict Peace Years (CPYRS) 0.019 0.160 -0.341 1.000         
War Peace Years (WPYRS) 0.064 -0.002 -0.205 0.644 1.000        
Democracy (DEML) -0.189 0.012 0.053 -0.012 -0.041 1.000       
Anocracy (ANOCL) 0.031 0.029 0.048 -0.015 0.174 -0.454 1.000      
New state (NWST) -0.083 0.167 -0.061 -0.081 -0.119 0.045 0.027 1.000     
Regime change (RGCHG) 0.085 -0.084 0.025 0.023 0.078 0.019 0.179 -0.050 1.000    
Oil production (OILPCL) -0.188 0.806 -0.443 0.183 0.079 -0.134 0.108 0.001 -0.015 1.000   
Mountainous terrain (LMTN) -0.075 0.007 0.410 -0.221 -0.393 -0.077 0.052 0.054 -0.042 -0.186 1.000  
Noncontiguous state (NCON) -0.181 0.139 0.293 -0.209 -0.309 0.200 -0.149 0.057 0.037 0.002 0.255 1.000 
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 APPENDIX D: Descriptive Statistics (female and male data) 
 
Variable (Female)    N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Civil Conflict Onset 846 0.046 0.210 0 1 
Civil War Onset 846 0.024 0.152 0 1 
Ethnic Civil Conflict Onset 846 0.033 0.179 0 1 
Ethnic Civil War Onset 846 0.015 0.123 0 1 
Female HEI 846 0.285 0.224 0.000 0.800 
GDP per capita 839 2.832 2.794 0.171 19.561 
Population (ln) 839 9.338 1.277 6.781 13.886 
Peace Years (Civil Conflict) 846 12.911 15.372 0 59 
Peace Years (Civil War) 846 21.267 18.336 0 59 
Democracy 834 0.308 0.462 0 1 
Anocracy 834 0.415 0.493 0 1 
New State 846 0.017 0.128 0 1 
Regime Change 846 0.187 0.390 0 1 
Oil Production per capita 839 0.634 2.193 0 16.407 
Mountainous Terrain (ln) 846 1.915 1.484 0 4.313 
Noncontiguous State 846 0.065 0.247 0 1 
 
 
Variable (Male)   N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Civil Conflict Onset 616 0.045 0.208 0 1 
Civil War Onset 616 0.019 0.138 0 1 
Ethnic Civil Conflict Onset 616 0.036 0.186 0 1 
Ethnic Civil War Onset 616 0.013 0.113 0 1 
Male HEI 616 0.249 0.182 0.144 0.749 
GDP per capita 611 2.158 2.365 0.338 14.007 
Population (ln) 611 9.117 0.941 6.781 11.337 
Peace Years (Civil Conflict) 616 13.731 14.560 0 59 
Peace Years (Civil War) 616 22.604 16.750 0 59 
Democracy 609 0.200 0.401 0 1 
Anocracy 609 0.452 0.498 0 1 
New State 616 0.016 0.126 0 1 
Regime Change 616 0.227 0.419 0 1 
Oil Production per capita 611 0.631 2.349 0 16.407 
Mountainous Terrain (ln) 616 1.667 1.446 0 4.313 
Noncontiguous State 616 0.057 0.232 0 1 
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